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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

TAXATION OF THE
FREE PRESS PRESS - NON-GENERAL SCHEMES OF TAXATION VIOLATE FIRST
AMENDMENT FREE PRESS CLAUSE. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
-

Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365
(1983).

In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commis2
sioner of Revenue,1 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
use tax' on paper and ink components of published material." Justice
O'Connor, announcing the opinion of the majority, found that the
manner in which the tax had been implemented 5 created an unconstitutional burden upon the Minnesota Star & Tribune Company's
(Star Tribune) first amendment right to freedom of the press. This
ruling reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision which had
upheld the regulation as a valid means of raising revenue.'
The Tax Reform and Relief Act of 19678 established a general
system of sales9 and use taxes in the State of Minnesota. 10 Origi1. 103 S.Ct. 1365 (1983).
2. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined. Justice Blackmun joined the majority in the opinion of the Court, excluding note 12. Justice White concurred in part and
dissented in part. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
3. A use tax is a tax imposed upon the use, storage, withdrawal or consumption of
tangible personal property within the borders of the taxing jurisdiction. P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL
LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 578 (1981). See also infra note 10.
4. Under Minnesota law, published matter includes "any publication regularly issued
at average intervals not exceeding three months . . . 'publication' as used herein shall include,
without limiting the foregoing, a legal newspaper . . ." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.25(i)
(West Supp. 1983). Magazines, advertising supplements, shoppers' guides, house organs, trade
and professional journals, and serially issued comic books have all been found to be publications. 13 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. 409(b) (1979). Advertising circulars distributed monthly
by wholesale and retail merchants have been ruled to be publications. See United Hardware
Distrib. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 284 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 1979).
5. See infra notes 14, 15, and 62-64 and accompanying text.
6. The first amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law abridging . . . the freedom of speech, or of the press..." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The first amendment guarantees are enforceable against states by way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (dictum).
7. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 314 N.W.2d
201 (Minn. 1981).
8. Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 32, art. 13, 1967 MINN. LAWS 2143, 2177.
9. A sales tax is a tax imposed upon the gross receipts, arising from a sale within the
state's jurisdiction, of tangible personal property not specifically excluded and not purchased
for resale. Developments in the Law, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate
Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 994 (1962). See also infra note 10.
10. A use tax is imposed as a compensatory or complementary tax upon the intended

nally, the scheme exempted from the use tax the gross receipts from
the sale, storage, use, or consumption of all tangible personal property used to produce a regularly issued publication.1 1 Publications
were also granted an exemption from sales tax.' 2 In 1971, however,
the Minnesota State Legislature revoked the exemption from paper
and ink tax that it had previously granted to publications. 3 The tax
measure to which the Star Tribune objected was enacted in 1974. It
granted an exemption from the use tax, but limited the exemption to
the first $100,000 of paper and ink products used annually." Under

this scheme, the Star Tribune paid over $600,000 a year in taxes for
the years 1974 and 1975, representing two-thirds of all revenue
5
raised by use taxes in the state.'
The Star Tribune petitioned the state department of revenue for
a refund of paper and ink use taxes paid from January 1974 to May
use of goods within the taxing state. It is applied only to goods on which the state has not
placed a sales tax, but which would have been subject to the sales tax if sold within that state.
The use tax, in conjunction with the sales tax, deters in-state businessmen from undercutting
local competition by purchasing goods in neighboring states that are not subject to the tax. See
Note, Economic Neutrality and the Compensating Use Tax, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1016 (1964).
"Thus, the use tax is designed to place a state on competitive parity with out of state retailers
exempt from the sales tax." National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551, 555 (1977).
It is now well-settled that the interstate commerce implications of sales and use tax
schemes do not render them unconstitutional. The use tax serves the purpose of equalizing
trade between the states, and if applied correctly, is not discriminatory. Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
11. 1967 MINN. LAWS 2186.
12. Id.
13. Act of Oct. 30, 1971, ch. 31, art. 1, § 5(l)(i); 1971 MINN. LAWS 2561, 2565.
14. MINN. STAT. § 297A.14 (1972) reads:
297A.14 USING, STORING, OR CONSUMING TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY; ADMISSIONS;
UTILITIES

For the privilege of using, storing, or consuming in Minnesota tangible personal
property, tickets or admissions to places of amusement and athletic events, electricity, gas, and local exchange telephone service purchased for use, storage or
consumption in this state, there is hereby imposed on every person in this state a
use tax at the rate of four percent of the sales price of sales at retail of any of
the aforementioned items made to such person after October 31, 1971, unless
the tax imposed by Section 297A.02 was paid on said sales price.
Motor vehicles subject to tax under this section shall be taxed at the fair
market value at the time of transport into Minnesota if such motor vehicles were
acquired more than three months prior to the transport into this state.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of Sections 297A.01 to 297A.44 to the contrary, the
cost of paper and ink productsexceeding $100,000 in any calendar year, used or consumed in
producing a publication as defined in Section 297A.25, subdivision 1,clause (i) is subject to
the tax imposed by this section. (The rate of the tax was raised by amendment to five percent
in 1981. Act of June 6, 1981, ch. 1, art. IV, § 5, 1981 MINN. SESs. LAW SERV. 2396 (West)).
15. In 1974, only eleven publishers of daily newspapers in the state paid any use tax on
ink and paper. In 1975, thirteen publishers paid the tax. The Star Tribune paid out $608,634
in 1974, and $636,113 in 1975. There was a total of 388 paid circulation newspapers in the
state in 1974, 29 of which were daily papers. In 1975, there were 374 paid circulation papers
in the state, 29 of which were daily newspapers. The Star Tribune paid the greatest amount of
in use taxes of any paper, while the least amount paid in 1974 was $120, and in 1975, $208.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 314 N.W.2d 201, 203, 204 nn.4,5 (Minn. 1981).

1975." The revenue department denied the refund and the Star
Tribune appealed to the Hennepin County district court.17 The Star
Tribune alleged that imposition of the use tax constituted an unconstitutional infringement of the right to freedom of the press and a
denial of equal protection under the law.' 8 The district court granted
summary judgment for the publisher, and the Commissioner of Revenue appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court."9
The state supreme court upheld the validity of the tax despite
the "strict standard" it believed should be applied when equal protection and first amendment interests coincide.20 The court applied a
test rooted in equal protection analysis.2 ' A legislative classification
for the purpose of regulation is deemed valid if it is thought to be

rational. 2 A stricter test is applied only if the court finds that a
fundamental liberty is infringed upon.

3

In this case, the supreme

16. The amount of the requested refund was $874,265.04. 314 N.W.2d at 202.
17. Id. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.35 (West 1983) allows any taxpayer whose refund
claim has been denied to appeal to the district court serving the county of the taxpayer's
residence.
18. The Star Tribune's equal protection claim is based on the fourteenth amendment,
which states in relevant part: " ... nor (shall any state) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
The equal protection clause prevents a legislature from creating classes'for the purpose of
regulation when the effect is to deprive one class of the protection of fundamental rights (de
jure discrimination). This undesirable result also occurs when a legislature fails to classify a
group to ensure its protection under the law (de facto discrimination). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 994 (1978). See also infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
19. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 314 N.W.2d at 203.
20. Id. at 205. The court determined that the equal protection and first amendment
issues were "inextricable."
21. The strict standard referred to by the state court is elucidated in Police Dept. v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosely, the Supreme Court invalidated a discriminatory picket law on equal protection grounds. The Court stated:
In a variety of contexts we have said that even though the government purpose
be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can not be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. . . . This standard, of course, has been carefully applied when First
Amendment interests are involved.
408 U.S. at 101 n.8. For a description of factors considered in equal protection analysis, see
infra note 23 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of the implications of intertwining first amendment and equal protection analysis, see Karst, Equality as a Central
Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975). See also Comment, Equal
but Inadequate Protection:A Look at Mosely and Grayned, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469
(1973).
22. "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Accord Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364 (1971).
23. If fundamental rights are infringed, courts utilize a strict scrutiny test which can be
satisfied only by a showing of a compelling government interest in the object of the classification, and proof that the method chosen least restricts fundamental rights. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marriage triggered equal protection strict scrutiny); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion). Strict scrutiny may also be
triggered by certain suspect classifications identified by the Supreme Court. See Takahashi v.
Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948) (ancestry); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).

court found no burden upon constitutionally protected rights. The
court found that the tax did not restrict circulation of the paper 4
nor did it favor one publisher over another.2 5 Moreover, the court
ruled that no improper motive indicating invidious discrimination
could be attributed to the legislature. 6 As a result, the court upheld
the use tax on the ground that the legislature's need to raise revenue
represented state interest.21
The constitutional conflict between government regulation and
freedom of the press represented by Star & Tribune caused little
concern in early Supreme Court cases.2 8 Before the first amendment
was made applicable to states,2 9 the Court refused to find that constitutional protection extended to the press. Rather, the Court
viewed the free press guarantee as an amorphous adjunct to the free
speech clause.30 The Court justified placing limitations upon the
press on grounds of public welfare" or police power.32 In Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States," for example, the Court refused to
find the press immune from contempt citations imposed for publishing criticisms of judicial proceedings3 4 Such treatment of free press
claims differs drastically from later cases involving an institutional24. The United States Supreme Court has held that restrictions upon circulation of
publications constitute unconstitutional infringements of freedom of the press. See Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
The state court found that the tax was related to the number of pages and amount of ink
used, not circulation. Circulation figures correspond only roughly with the payment of use
taxes. 314 N.W.2d at 203-04, 209.
25. The Supreme Court has stated generally that the government may not restrict the
speech of some members of society to enhance the speech of others. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976).
The court pointed out that any resulting favoritism would be purely theoretical, and that
the effects of the use tax were normal effects of any taxation. 314 N.W.2d at 210.
26. 314 N.W.2d at 205-08. The court cited Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936), to support the proposition that a regulation aimed at the press with censorial
motives violates the right to freedom of the press. The case concerned a tax placed upon newspapers in Louisiana with circulations over 20,000. All but one of the newspapers were highly
critical of then Governor Huey Long. But see infra note 60.
27. 314 N.W.2d at 210. See also infra note 81.
28. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
29.

See supra note 6.

30. The Supreme Court has spoken in free speech terms even when considering cases
involving publications. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court found that
circulars that advocated draft avoidance were not forms of protected speech because they
posed a clear and present danger. Nowhere in Justice Holmes' opinion is there a discussion of
free press implications. See also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920) (case
concerning foreign language publication uses "free speech" and "free press" terms interchangeably); Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978

SuP. CT. REV. 225, 252-59.
31. See In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892) (Congress permitted to bar from the mails
published matter is deemed to be injurious to the public welfare).
32. See Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 (1890) (press may be excluded from execution and barred from publishing an account of executions).
33. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
34. Contra Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (contempt citation for reporting judicial proceedings reversed on free press grounds).

ized press"5 with a more defined role as supplier of information to
the public."6
In the 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota,37 the Supreme Court
ruled that an injunction prohibiting publication of a newspaper that
had previously printed morally objectionable matter"8 constituted a
prior restraint" on publication. This state-authorized action, according to the Court, was equivalent to censorship, and constituted an
40
impermissible governmental intrusion on first amendment rights.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court invalidated various41 prior restraints 42 because they unduly interfered with the informational role
of the press.4 8 These prior restraints were held to interrupt the chan35. The term "institutional press" refers to established, privately organized, profit-making businesses whose job it is to report the news on a regular basis. The "soapbox orator" or
the "nonconformist pamphleteer" are not encompassed by the term. Stewart, Or of the Press,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 632-33 (1974). As used here, the "press" or the "institutional press"
does not refer to the broadcast media. Although broadcasters are guaranteed many of the
same first amendment rights, they are subject to a significantly greater degree of regulation
that publishers: There is no "unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). These restrictions are due primarily to physical limitations of
the broadcast spectrum. Id. Accord FCC v. National Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775 (1978).

36. It is now well accepted that the free press guarantee of the first amendment was
created for the benefit of the citizenry, and is grounded in the broad societal interest in a full
and free flow of information to the public. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
37. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
38. The pertinent statute defined as a "nuisance" the publication of obscene, lewd, lascivious, malicious, scandalous, or defamatory newspapers, magazines, or periodicals. The statute permitted subsequent publication of the offending paper to be enjoined by court order. It
also permitted the prosecution of "participants" and owners of such publications for committing a nuisance. 1925 MINN. LAws ch. 285, § 1.
39. A prior restraint is defined as "any governmental order which restricts or prohibits
speech prior to its publication." J.NOVACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 744 (1978). See also infra note 41.
40. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 697.
41. There are principally four forms of prior restraint. The most obvious type occurs
when dissemination of a publication or communication is denied absent approval of an executive official. The second form comprises restraints imposed by judicial action or injunction
through contempt proceedings. The third form of prior restraint makes publication unlawful,
unless the publisher complies with specific conditions imposed by law. The fourth form of prior
restraint includes methods in which political, religious, or other forms of expression are used as
preconditions to publication. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. AND CONTEMPT.
PRoa. 648, 655-56 (1955). See also Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical
Developments, 66 MINN. L. REV. 95 (1981); Note, Prior Restraint - A Test of Invalidity in
Free Speech Cases?, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1949).

42. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (court order enjoining
reporting of information that implicated excused criminal is invalid as a prior restraint); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (injunction against publication of Pentagon Papers would be a prior restraint); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (statute banning advertising by loudspeakers in automobiles invalidated); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance forbidding distribution of leaflets without permission held invalid).
See also 16A AM. JUR.2d Constitutional Law § 498 and cases collected therein.
43.

Prior restraints are not, however, unconstitutional per se. Southeastern Promotions

Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). A system of prior restraint is unconstitutional when it
lacks certain safeguards: the censor must bear the burden of proving that the material is un-

nel of information flowing from press to people, and proved espe-

cially burdensome to open discussion of governmental affairs."" Statutory or judicial devices that clearly censor, as in Near, are plainly

unconstitutional; the doctrine against prior restraint, however, is
equally applicable to facially neutral statutes which have an underly-

ing motive of affecting the communicative impact of information. 5
If prior restraint may be viewed as a "freeze" upon first amendment rights, certain government regulations with otherwise valid
goals may indirectly affect first amendment rights, and cause a
"chill"."' In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,47 for example, the Court invalidated a "right to reply" statute partly because
forcing an editor to print replies may lead him to avoid controversy
altogether,
and thereby constrict the flow of information to the public. 48 The chilling effect of certain regulations leads to a form of selfcensorship,49 attributable to state action and as unacceptable as any
content-related prior restraint. 50 The role of the press, when jeopardized either by obviously offensive means or by subtle interference,
has been stalwartly defended by the Supreme Court."'
protected, and if the restraint is prior to judicial review, it can be imposed for only a short
period in order to preserve the status quo. 420 U.S. at 559-60.
44. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). See also Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231
(1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
45. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-20 (1978). The Supreme Court
has expressed some hesitancy in attempting to speculate on the motivation of legislatures: "It
is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). Yet courts routinely use the statements of legislators and
executives in evaluating the nature of a statute: "To the extent that (some of our cases) suggest a generally applicable proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional
adjudication, our prior cases . . . are to the contrary." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
244 n.ll (1976).
46. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
47. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
48. Id. at 257. The Court advanced two additional reasons for invalidating the statute:
the statute is a command to print an item, and so exacts a penalty on the content of the paper
by forcing expenditures for extra print; the statute interfered with the editorial function, which
is generally an improper area for governmental regulation. Id. at 256-58.
49. For an in-depth analysis of the relation of prior restraints to self-censorship, see
Blasi, Toward a Theory of PriorRestraint: The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 25-49
(1981).
50. The chilling effect is present primarily in only two types of statutes: those which
are overbroad and those which are overly vague. When a law is "overbroad" it regulates both
protected and unprotected speech. The rule against overbreadth forbids a statute to "sweep
within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise of [freedom of expression] . . ."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). Although an overbroad statute is not necessarily vague, a vague statute is unconstitutional because, like an overbroad statute, it may regulate protected as well as unprotected communication. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965). See also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 432-33 (1963); Shaman, The First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP.
L.Q. 259 (1979).
51. See supra note 42. But see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (press not
immune from pretrial discovery of editorial processes); see generally Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (authorizing exclusion of broadcast media from criminal trial

Limitations upon freedom of the press, however, exist as they do
upon any first amendment guarantee. 2 Other constitutional rights
can conflict with the press clause, creating a limitation on free press
activities.5" More extensive limitations may be applied to aspects of
the institutional press when proprietary rather than informational
characteristics of the organization are affected." In this respect, the
Supreme Court has refused to grant special privileges to the press
not afforded to ordinary individuals under the first amendment.5 5 In
one of the early cases in this area, Associated Press v. United
States,56 the institutional press claimed an exemption from federal
antitrust laws on the ground that the amendment prohibited government interference in certain business dealings of a news agency.57 As
it has done in other cases, the Court stressed that protections afforded the press are bounded by the press's role in securing first
amendment freedoms of the public.58 The Court held that as long as
the regulatory scheme is general and nondiscriminatory, no special
privileges afforded the press would prevent its proprietary interests
from being affected. 59
In Star & Tribune the Supreme Court again faced a situation
in which a publication entitled to protection under the first amendment challenged the validity of a state regulation. Justice O'Connor,
however, writing for the Court, could find no controlling precedent,
stating that prior decisions on similar issues were subject to conflictproceedings).
52. Rights protected under the first amendment may be restricted when communication
constitutes a "clear and present danger" of inciting violence or illegal conduct. See Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Similarly,
where a communication constitutes a defamatory falsehood, it may lose its full constitutional
protection. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Where material is obscene,
or where certain expressive acts fall outside the realm of protected speech, first amendment
protections may likewise be limited. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
53. This is often the case where rights of the press conflict with the right to privacy or
to a fair trial. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (media excluded from
courtroom proceedings); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private citizen
may recover from newspaper on libel action by mere showing of publisher's negligence).
54. See Citizens' Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (newspaper not
immune from antitrust laws); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946)
(application of Fair Labor Standards Act to newspaper); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103 (1937) (provisions of National Labor Relations Act applicable to newspapers). But cf.
Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (antitrust violation of
newspaper reversed, citing exemption of newspaper because of economic conditions of the
period).
55. See supra note 54.
56. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
57. The Associated Press specifically alleged that compulsory sharing of news copy
would be a by-product of the antitrust law's application. This result, it was argued, would be
the equivalent of a compulsory utterance, and therefore, unconstitutional. See Brief for Appellant, reprinted in 89 L. Ed. 2020.
58. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.

ing interpretations." The majority therefore, turned to general first
amendment principles to determine the validity of the tax. 61
Justice O'Connor began her analysis by noting that the paper
and ink tax was divorced from the general regulatory scheme in
Minnesota. Minnesota law generally exempts intermediate components of a finished product in favor of taxing the finished product
itself.4 The paper and ink tax, on the other hand, taxed components
of a publication, even though a newspaper could be taxed at retail."
As applied by the state legislature, the paper and ink tax was found
to be contrary to the declared policy of use and sales taxation in
Minnesota." In a typical use and sales tax system, use tax is
designed to complement sales tax. 6 The paper and ink tax, the
Court noted, lacked this complementary function." The Court, then,
found it to be a revenue measure unique in the taxation system of
the state. 7
The Court recognized that free press rights may be limited by
certain forms of regulation," provided that such regulation is part of
a general scheme. 69 The general applicability of any law ensures that
political restraints exerted by the majority will prevent the legislature from interfering with protected rights of the people."' When
certain groups are singled out for regulations, however, this political
safeguard is bypassed, and the possibility of manipulation or abuse
of the law greatly increases."1 The majority recognized the unique
''72
nature of the paper and ink tax and labelled it a "special tax.
Since the regulation was not applied generally, the Court feared that
this potentially dangerous tax posed a threat to the vital informa60. MinneapolisStar & Tribune, 103 S. Ct. at 1369. The Court agreed with the state
court that Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) presented a close factual
situation, but refused to rely on the reasoning of that case. Grosjean has been cited in support
of the proposition that a tax that singles out the press is invalid if imposed for censorial purposes. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 383
(1973). Grosjean, however, has also been interpreted to mean that any tax singling out the
press is unconstitutional. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
61. 103 S. Ct. at 1369. Unlike the state court, the Supreme Court did not find the
equal protection and first amendment issues inextricable. The Court never reached the Star
Tribune's equal protection claim. 103 S. Ct. at 1376 n.17.
62. The Minnesota tax scheme exempted from the use tax the gross receipts from the
sale of materials used or consumed in the production of property intended to be sold at retail.
Such protection specifically included the printing process. MINN. STAT. § 297A.25(l)(h). The
use tax upon paper and ink was the only exception to this scheme.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1370.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See supra note 10.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 1370.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 54.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 1372.
70. Id. See generally Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1949) (Jackson, J.,concurring).
71. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, supra note 70, at 113.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 1370.

tional role of the press. 3
The Supreme Court approaches government actions that infringe upon first amendment rights in one of two ways. If the regulation is imposed with intent to limit the communicative impact of information, the Court applies a strict standard of review.7 4 The
government must prove that it acted in furtherance of a compelling
government interest and that no less restrictive means exist to
achieve its purpose.7 5 If the infringement is an unintended result of
an otherwise inoffensive regulation, the Court utilizes a balancing
test .7 a The importance of the interest and the extent to which it has
been infringed is weighed against the importance of the government's regulation.7 7 Under this test, the government must still establish that no less restrictive means are available and that a substantial
government interest exists. But under the balancing test, evidence of
means and ends is treated merely as a factor to be weighed instead
of as a prerequisite to a statute's validity, as under a strict scrutiny
standard.78
Having identified the challenged regulation as a form of "differential taxation,' 79 and thus finding no indication of content-related
regulation, Justice O'Connor employed a balancing test.80 The majority acknowledged that taxation was fundamental to the state's
very existence. 8' The Court could not, however, condone the imposition of a nongeneral regulatory scheme upon the press. Given the
dangers inherent in such forms of taxation8" and the historical background of the press clause, 83 the application of the tax to the press
73.

Id. at 1372.

74.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2, 12-5 (1978). See also supra
notes 39-41.
75. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (statute regulating information about drug prices invalidated); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (statute forbidding advocacy of criminal syndication
invalidated).
76. L. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-2, at 580.
77. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). See also Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
78. L. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-2, at 580.
79. 103 S. Ct. at 1374.
80. Id. at 1369-1376. The Court refused to speculate on the legislature's motive given
the lack of legislative history dealing with the relevant statutes.
81. Id. at 1372. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the fundamental nature of
the taxing power. See State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
82. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
83. The Court briefly discussed the well known debate between the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists at the Constitution's inception. Anti-Federalists lobbied for the adoption of a
press clause within the first amendment as a guarantee of a free press. They were obviously
successful. See 103 S.Ct. at 1371-72. For a short but informative account of the FederalistAnti-Federalist debate, see Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV.
455, 475-85 (1983). For a brief overview of the various taxing devices used by English colonial
rulers to control early American presses, see Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 381-85 (1946). The English practices undoubtedly had some effect on the content of
the first amendment.

was especially objectionable. The Court expressed its concern that a
tax imposed outside the bounds of political restraint could act as a
"threat of sanctions," equal in effect to an active censure.84 The
availability of a generally applicable sales tax which would prevent
these evils persuaded the Court to invalidate the tax."5
Justice O'Connor viewed the "tailoring" of the tax to limit its
effect to a handful of publishers as a second reason to strike down
the measure.8s The Court rejected the government's attempt to justify the $100,000 exemption as an equitable assignment of tax burdens. Large publishers are not necessarily more profitable, the Court
noted,8 7 and similar exemptions for other types of small businesses
were conspicuously absent.88
The strongest justification offered by the state for its special tax
was that it imposed less of a burden upon the press than a sales tax
would.8 9 Justice O'Connor flatly rejected the argument. The dangers
inherent in differential forms of taxation exist regardless of whether
the regulation is less burdensome than a sales tax.90 Furthermore,
the majority asserted, courts are poorly equipped to evaluate the relative burdens of various forms of taxation.91 The Court concluded
that when first amendment values hang in the balance, the risk that
a court may approve a differential tax under the guise of a valid
regulation because of an innocent miscalculation must be avoided.9"
In his partial dissent, Justice White criticized the scope of the

majority's decision. White contended that the paper and ink tax was
invalid solely because the state limited the tax burden to a small

number of papers.93 He objected to what he considered an unnecessary inquiry into the validity of the tax as applied to all newspa-

pers," but reserved his harshest criticism for the majority's refusal
84. 103 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
85. Id. at 1376.
86. Id. at 1375. Justice O'Connor found the ability to manipulate this special tax indicative of the dangers of a nongeneral scheme of taxation.
87. Id. at 1376.
88. Id. The Court analogized to Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178
(1946), in which the Court upheld exemptions granted to smaller publishers by the Fair Labor
Standards Act because the exemptions were granted to small businesses in general.
89. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
91. 103 S. Ct. at 1374-75. Justice O'Connor admitted that the Court was forced, at
times, to weigh the relative burdens of different forms of taxation. The Court did so, however,
only in the absence of less restrictive means of imposing a tax. The Court, Justice O'Connor
noted, was not confronted with such a situation in this case. Furthermore, judicial inquiries
into the economic effect of a tax have been limited to due process and commerce clause cases.
First amendment issues preclude such speculative inquiries. Id. at 1374 n.12.
92. Id. at 1374 n.12.
93. Id. at 1376. Justice White agreed, however, that first amendment considerations
controlled in the disposition of the case.
94. Id. Justice White agreed with Justice Rehnquist's dissent that the paper and ink
tax, if applied equally to all publishers, would be valid.

to evaluate the overall burden created by the use tax. Pointing out
that the court examines relative tax burdens when determining the
economic effects of a tax imposed in a discriminatory manner upon
the federal government,98 Justice White argued that it was fully appropriate to apply the same analytical tools in Star & Tribune.
Justice Rehnquist was the sole member of the Court willing to
uphold the tax. His dissent not only viewed the tax as an obvious
advantage to the press,9 but also attempted to refute the Court's
contention that the burden of such exactions was too difficult to evaluate. 97 Justice Rehnquist computed what he believed to be the relative burdens of each tax and demonstrated that the paper and ink
tax produced substantial savings for the press. 9
The dissent objected to the standard of review chosen by the
majority, preferring a less strict equal protection analysis. 99 Under a
more relaxed analysis, an impermissible infringement of fundamental rights would strike the tax. 00 No such infringement could be
demonstrated, Justice Rehnquist insisted, if the majority refused to
determine the actual burden of the tax upon newspapers. 10 Justice
Rehnquist advocated deferral to the state legislature, given the rational nature of the classification"'0 and the absence of discriminatory motive on the legislature's part. 03
The Star & Tribune decision demonstrates that the free press
guarantees of the first amendment will not tolerate a nongeneral
scheme of taxation affecting news publications. The Supreme
Court's refusal to rely on cases that may have been of precedential
value' 04 resulted in a fresh application of modern free press principles to a problem left undecided for nearly fifty years.' 0 5 In invali95. Justice White was apparently referring to Washington v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
1344 (1983), a decision handed down the same day as Star & Tribune. In Washington, the
Court examined a state practice of imposing a tax upon construction site owners. When the
owner was the federal government, however, the state levied the tax upon the contractors
working at the site. The relative burdens of each form of taxation were evaluated, and the
state's practice was upheld. Star & Tribune was cited in the dissenting opinion in Washington.
See 103 S. Ct. at 1355.
96. 103 S. Ct. at 1381. Justice Rehnquist preferred to emphasize the $4000 credit that
the $100,000 exemption bestowed upon the Star Tribune. See also infra note 98.
97. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1379. Justice Rehnquist's computations indicated a $2,460,345 savings for
the newspapers when a use tax, rather than a sales tax, was imposed. The majority responded
to the dissent's calculations by pointing out certain economic uncertainties, both in theory and
in application. See 103 S. Ct. at 1375 n. 14.
99. See supra notes 18, 21-23 and accompanying text.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 1380 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976) (per curiam)).
101. Id.at 1380.
102. Id. at 1381.
103. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated that absent a discriminatory intent on the part of the
Minnesota Legislature, a tax singling out newspapers is valid. But see supra note 60.
104.
105.

See supra note 26.
See supra note 60.

dating a form of regulation solely because of its potential for abuse,
the Court has shown a high regard for the informational role of the
press. At the same time, the Court has upheld the constitutionality
of general schemes of taxing publications, thereby denying the press
any special privileges accruing to it as a modern institution.

[Casenote by Mark I. Schwemler].

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

SEARCH AND SEIZURE POLICE
MAY TEMPORARILY DETAIN PERSONAL LUGGAGE FOR LIMITED
INVESTIGATORY PURPOSES UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT

LUGGAGE CONTAINS NARCOTICS.

United States v. Place, 103 S.

Ct. 2637 (1983).

In United States v. Place,1 the United States Supreme Court'
held that law enforcement authorities who reasonably suspects that
4
narcotics are concealed in luggage carried by a traveler may briefly
detain the luggage "to investigate the circumstances that aroused
[their] suspicion."' The Court allowed an exception to the traditional requirement of probable causes because of the government's
strong interest in enforcement of narcotics laws and the brief nature
of the detainment. Under the facts of this case, however, the Court
ruled that the defendant's fourth amendment rights had been violated because the ninety minute retention of his luggage exceeded
the permissible bounds of an investigative detention. While prior decisions have allowed a brief detention of persons on reasonable suspicion,7 Place is the first United States Supreme Court decision which
expressly authorizes the seizure of personal property on less than
probable cause.8
1. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
2. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, concurred in the result. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment.
3. See infra note 35.
4. The Court declined to limit the amount of time luggage permissibly could be detained. Under the facts of this case, the Court held that a ninety minute detention was
excessive.
5. 103 S. Ct. at 2644. The Court expressly approved the exposure of the luggage to a
sniff test by a trained narcotics dog. 103 S. Ct. at 2639. However, the Court did not indicate
specifically what is permissible. The Court stated that an officer may "detain the luggage
briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope." 103 S. Ct. at 2641.
6. See infra note 29.
7. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion) (stop of
person suspected of conveying illicit drugs); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (detainment of individual while police searched house pursuant to search warrant); and United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (border stop of vehicle suspected of smuggling illegal
aliens).
8. In United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), the Supreme Court held
that the delay of two packages suspected of containing stolen coins by postal officials, one for 3
hours and the other for 29 hours prior to obtaining probable cause was not an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The case is of limited precedential value,
however, because the Court left unclear whether it regarded defendant's interest in the prompt
delivery of its packages as a protectible fourth amendment interest. Id. at 252.

On August 17, 1979, two law enforcement agents at the Miami

International Airport were suspicious of Raymond Place's behavior
as he arranged a flight to La Guardia Airport.9 The agents approached Place, asked for some identification and requested permission to search his luggage.1" Place agreed to allow the search, however, the agents, noticing that Place's flight was about to depart,
elected not to conduct the search and permitted Place to leave."
The two Florida officials relayed their suspicions to Drug En-

forcement Administration (DEA) 12 authorities in New York. The
DEA agents in New York observed Place as he deplaned and
claimed his luggage.1 3 The DEA agents stopped Place and requested
permission to search the two bags that he was carrying."' Place refused to allow the search. The agents then seized the luggage and
informed Place that he was free to go but that they would detain his
luggage until a federal judge could determine whether a search war15
rant should issue.

The agents transported the luggage to Kennedy Airport where it
was subjected to a sniff test by a trained narcotics dog 16 approxi9. The two law enforcement officials were Dade County, Florida detectives. Drug enforcement authorities are often stationed at major metropolitan airports such as Miami International in an effort to intercept illegal drugs that are transported by air. The officers closely
observe passengers, attempting to discern whether they exhibit traits which match those in a
drug carrier profile - a compilation of characteristics thought to be common of those who
carry illicit drugs. See Comment, Reformulating Seizures - Airport Drug Stops and the
Fourth Amendment, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1486, 1487-88 (1981); Comment, Airport Seizures of
Luggage Without Probable Cause: Are They "'Reasonable"?1982 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1089-90.
The detective's suspicions were aroused by Place's systematic scanning of the airport
lobby area and general nervousness as he waited in line to purchase'a ticket - two traits that
match the drug carrier profile. United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1218-19 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
10. 498 F. Supp. at 1219. Upon stopping Place, the detectives displayed their credentials and explained that they were concerned about narcotics smuggling. They informed Place
that he was under no obligation to allow them to search his bags. Id.
i1. At this juncture the detectives were not planning to take further action. Then suspicions were renewed, however, when Place, while departing, remarked: "Hey, I know you guys
were cops when I saw you down in the lobby." The detectives then ran a check on two addresses that were listed on Place's luggage tags. The check revealed that neither address existed. Id. at 1220.
12. See generally R. FERGUSON, DRUG ABUSE CONTROL 190-91 (1975). The DEA is a
comprehensive federal law enforcement agency charged with the responsibility of fighting drug
abuse. The administration was established on July 1, 1973, when several smaller agencies
merged.
In 1974 the DEA launched an extensive airport surveillance program. See Comment, Reformulating Seizures - Airport Drug Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
1486, 1486-88; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
13. 498 F. Supp. at 1220. Place continued to manifest "suspicious" behavior as he
proceeded through La Guardia Airport. Id. See supra note 9.
14. 498 F. Supp. 1220-21. The officers identified themselves and informed Place of
their suspicion that he was carrying illegal drugs. Id.
15. The DEA agents did not tell Place how long his bags would be detained. The officers did notify Place that he was free to accompany the bags. Place declined to do so, Place
left after obtaining the officers' telephone number. Id. at 1221.
16. The dogs are specially trained to react to the smell of narcotics. Canines are used

mately ninety minutes after the bag had been taken from Place, the
dog reacted affirmatively to one of the bags. A search warrant issued,'" and a search of the luggage revealed 1,125 grams of cocaine.
At trial for the possession of narcotics with intent to distribute,"8 Place moved to supress the cocaine, alleging that seizure of
his luggage without probable cause violated his fourth amendment
rights." The District Court denied the motion, ruling that the officers' reasonable suspicion that the luggage contained narcotics was
sufficient to support its seizure.2 0 Place was subsequently convicted
of the offense."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 2 While
agreeing with the District Court that luggage could briefly be detained upon reasonable suspicion, the Court held that the ninety
minute detention was excessive and required a showing of probable
cause.2 3 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. 4 The
issue, as framed by the Supreme Court, was whether the fourth
amendment prohibited the temporary detainment of personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics dog on the basis of a reason25
able suspicion that the luggage contained narcotics.

The fourth amendment safeguards an individual's right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his person or property.2 6 Accordingly, for any search or seizure to be constitutionally
widely to detect drugs and have been so used for the past several years. The customs service
estimated that in fiscal year 1973 "[its) dog teams accounted for the seizure of 22,722 pounds
of marijuana, 2166 of hashish, 25 pounds of cocaine, 13 pounds of heroin and 2 million units
of dangerous drugs (detected because of similar chemical properties)." Note, United States v.
Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers Come Down With a Case of Constitutional Nasal
Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 416 n.31 (1976). See infra notes 67-71 and accom-

panying text (for a discussion on the Place Court's holding that this technique is not a search).
17. The search warrant was issued by a United States Magistrate on the Monday following the Friday seizure. 498 F. Supp. at 1218. A warrant issues if a dog, shown to be
reliable, affirmatively indicates the presence of narcotics. See United States v. Race, 529 F.2d
12 (1st Cir. 1976). See also IW. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT §2.2(f) at 281-82 (1978).
18. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1).
19. In further support of his motion to suppress, Place contended that the detention of
his person at both Miami International and La Guardia was unconstitutional because it was
not based on reasonable suspicion. He also argued that the sniff test of his luggage was conducted in a manner that biased the dog's reaction. The District Court ruled that the police did
have reasonable suspicion to make the initial stops and found Place's second argument without
merit. Id. at 1217. Neither the Second Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court
reached these issues.
20. Id. at 1227.
21. Id. Upon the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress, Place pleaded guilty,
reserving the right to appeal the Court's ruling. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 45 (2d
Cir. 1981).
22. Id. at 44.
23. Id. at 53.
24. 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983).
25. Id. at 2639.
26. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper and effects,

permissible it must be found to be reasonable.27 Generally, a search
or seizure is not reasonable unless made pursuant to a warrant2 8
which is based on probable cause29 and issued prior to the conduct.8 0
This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. The Supreme
Court has held that a search may be reasonable absent a warrant
when certain exigencies exist. For example, in Cupp v. Murphy', the
Supreme Court held that a warrant is not required to satisfy fourth
amendment reasonableness when immediate action is necessary to
prevent the destruction of evidence.
Place did not challenge the absence of a warrant because the
circumstances of the seizure fit within the Cupp exception. 2
The thrust of Place's argument for supression was that the police did not meet the second condition of reasonableness; the requirement of probable cause. The Supreme Court, however, held in Terry
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
The colonists adopted the fourth amendment to protect against the use of general warrants and writs of assistance - devices employed by the British which authorized indiscriminate searches and seizures of a person or his property on mere suspicion. Stelzner, The Fourth
Amendment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV. 33 (1979). See also
I W. LAFAVE, supra note 17 §1.1, at 3-6 (1978).
27. Clearly, the police "seized" Place's luggage. The government made no argument to
the contrary.
28. A warrant is a written order issued by a magistrate which directs a law enforcement official to arrest an individual or search his person or property. See BLACKS' LAW DIcTIONARY 1421 (5th ed. 1979).
The purpose of the warrant requirement was explained by Justice Douglas in McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948). "The presence of a search warrant serves a
high function . . . [l]t interpose[s a magistrate between the citizen and the police. .

.

. [the

warrant requirement] was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade
privacy in order to enforce the law."
29. "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Caroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
30. United States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. at 2641. This view of the proper standard of
reasonableness has not been adopted by all members of the Court at all times. The controversy
is largely a result of imperfections in the drafting of the amendment itself. The text of the
amendment does not include a definition of unreasonable. Nor does the amendment define the
relationship between the clause which proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures and the
clause which sets forth the requirement of a warrant. The ambiguity has given rise to two
opposing interpretations of "reasonableness". The first interpretation holds that the reasonableness clause is pre-eminent and independent of the warrant clause and posits that police conduct is permissible so long as it is reasonable under the facts and circumstances of each case.
This position was adopted by some members of the Court at various times. See, e.g., United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (majority opinion) (overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). For the most part this position has not taken firm hold and the
court has generally taken a second view that searches and seizures are only reasonable if conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975).
31. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
32. The officers reasonably concluded that had they not immediately seized the luggage
and allowed Place to depart, they would have foregone any chance of confiscating the drugs.

v. Ohio"3 that probable cause is not always required.
In Terry, an experienced police officer stopped a man whom the
officer suspected was armed and about to commit a robbery. When
the man answered the officer's question inaudibly, the officer
grabbed him and made a quick frisk of his outer clothing. The
search produced a weapon. The Court upheld the officer's action
even though it was unsupported by probable cause. 4 The Court reasoned that probable cause, the traditional standard of reasonableness, merely represented a quantum of suspicion thought to strike an
equitable balance between the public's right to personal security and
the government's interest in law enforcement. As applied to the ordinary arrest or search situation, it was the appropriate yardstick. Yet
when the challenged police conduct is merely mildly intrusive, the
competing interests need to be re-evaluated. The Court concluded
that when the brief stop and frisk was balanced against the strong
government interests of crime detention and officer safety, the conduct could be justified on reasonable suspicion.8 5
The Court's analysis in Terry departed from traditional fourth
amendment precedent in two ways. First, rather than mechanically
requiring a showing of probable cause, the Court defined a special
category of fourth amendment seizures so substantially less intrusive
that the traditional standard could be replaced with a balancing test.
Second, in applying this balancing test the Court upheld a limited
frisk for weapons upon reasonable suspicion. Despite this marked departure in reasoning, the Court couched its opinion in very narrow
terms, a6 thus clouding the impact of the decision.
There are two alternate interpretations of the Terry decision:
first, Terry merely represents a hard and fast exception to the proba33.
34.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 27.

35. Id. Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard of certainty than probable cause. One
commentator characterized the comparison of the two standards as a difference between reasonably believing that a suspect is involved in criminal activity and reasonably suspecting that
he is involved in criminal activity. Comment, Airport Seizures of Luggage on Less than Probable Cause: Are They Reasonable?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1090 n.8.

The Court noted that despite the lower standard, an officer cannot base his action on a
mere hunch but must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that support his suspicion. 392 U.S. at 21.
Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter in Terry. Douglas objected to the Court's balancing
test, asserting that probable cause is the only acceptable standard which justifies infringement,
however slight, upon an individual's fourth amendment rights. 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
36. The Terry Court merely held that:
[When] a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably
conclude . . . that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. . . . he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such person in an attempt to discover weapons.
Id. at 30.

ble cause requirement that is unique and should not be extended beyond its own facts; second, the balancing test applied in Terry supplants prior fourth amendment analysis and is now to be applied in
all fourth amendment cases.
The progeny of Terry evinces that the Court has not strictly
adopted the first interpretation. The probable cause requirement has
been excused in some cases when the official intrusion, the police
motive behind the action, or both, were different than in Terry. For
example, in Adams v. Williams37 , the Court held that a brief stop of
a person could be based on reasonable suspicion.38 Similarly, in
9 the Court ruled that the police
United States v. Brignone-Ponce"
motive underlying a brief stop need not be officer safety to qualify
for the lower standard.40
The Court has also declined to adopt the second interpreta4
tion. 1 In Dunnaway v. New York,4 2 the Court rejected the government's argument that a balancing test should be employed to determine whether a lengthy custodial interrogation of a suspect could be
conducted on reasonable suspicion. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, stated that Terry merely marked an exception to the probable
cause requirement that should be narrowly construed. The Terry
balancing test is only to be applied when police conduct is substantially less intrusive than a full search or arrest.4
In short, the Terry line of decisions, at most, reveals that the
Court has taken a position somewhere between the two suggested
interpretations. Moreover, because all of the cases involved searches
and seizures of persons, none addressed the specific questions at issue
in Place: first, whether Terry principles can be extended to justify a
brief seizure of personal property on less than probable cause, and;
second, if Terry principles are generally applicable, how unintrusive
must a seizure be to qualify for a lower standard. Several lower fed37. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
38. The Terry Court expressly declined to address the issue of the constitutionality of
an investigatory stop upon less than probable cause. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. But language in the
opinion suggests that the Court approved of such a stop: "A police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id. at
22.
39. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
40. The Court has upheld a search or seizure on less than probable cause when the
intrusion or motive was different than in Terry in the following cases: Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (order to get out of car); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (stop of auto to detect illegal aliens); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
(detention of individual during execution of search warrant); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979) (stop of auto by roving patrol); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct.
2573 (1983) (stop of vessel by roving patrol).
41. But see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (wherein Court seemed to
apply a general reasonableness test).
42. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
43. Id. at 211. See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).

eral courts have addressed these questions but the decisions vary
both in result and rationale.
In United States v. Hunt,"' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the temporary nature of a seizure was of no consequence
and that all seizures of property require probable cause." In contrast, the Second Circuit in Place""held that the principles of Terry
were readily applicable to a brief seizure of property.47 Likewise, the
Seventh' 8 and First 9 Circuits have approved short detentions of
property on reasonable suspicion. The latter two courts, however, did
not regard the applicability of Terry as self-evident and cited United
States v. Van Leeuwen 50 as authority for the appropriateness of the
5
extension. 5' A fourth view was taken in United States v. Martell, 2
in which the Ninth Circuit held that, while Terry was inapplicable
because it dealt only with seizures of persons, the detainment of luggage on reasonable suspicion was permissible if found to be reasonable given all the facts and circumstances of the case.5"
Those courts which do recognize the possibility of a seizure of
luggage on less than probable cause disagree on the permissible parameters of such a seizure. At one extreme is the Second Circuit in
Place, which ruled that the same standard applicable to brief detentions of persons also applies to seizures of luggage from the immediate possession of the owner. 5 At the opposite pole, the Martell
Court appears to adopt as an outer boundary the twenty-nine hour
detainment upheld in Van Leeuwen.55 Regan v. United States56 represents a middle ground. In Regan, the First Circuit took the position that the maximum permissible delay is somewhere between the
limits set in Terry and Van Leeuwen. 7
44. 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id. at 892. Accord United States v. O'Connor, 658 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1981)
(seizure of briefcase held to require probable cause).
46. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981).
47. But see United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (Terry relates
only to detainment of persons); Comment, Seizing Luggage on Less than Probable Cause, 18
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 637, 643-46 (1981).
48. United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980).
49. United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (lst cir. 1981).
50. See supra note 8.
51. The Court's reliance on Van Leeuwen has been criticized. See Comment, supra
note 47 (in which the author argues that Van Leeuwen should be confined to its unique facts)
United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
52. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. The Martell decision is based on a broad reading of Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692 (1981).
54. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981) (fourth amendment makes no
distinction between persons and property).
55. United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981).
56. 687 F.2d 531 (1st Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 537. Other courts simply did not address the issue of duration. See, e.g.,
United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71 (1st
Cir. 1981); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980).

In Place, the Supreme Court expressly held that personal luggage could be seized upon reasonable suspicion. The Court also clarified the permissible scope of an investigative detention by equating
the seizure of luggage from an individual with the seizure of persons.
The Place Court began its analysis by noting the general rule
that seizures of property are only reasonable when they are based on
probable cause or when they fit within a recognized exception to the
rule.58 Next, the Court focused on the question of whether the Terry
exception to the probable cause requirement was applicable to
seizures of luggage. 9
In examining Terry and its progeny, the Court identified two
elements in each case which were prerequisites to a departure from
the standard of probable cause. The two elements comprised an intrusion that was substantially less offensive than a full search or arrest, and an important government interest that prompted the police
conduct.10 The Court reasoned that if the seizure of luggage for the
purpose of drug control met these requirements, no barrier would
prevent extending the Terry rationale.
Addressing the sufficiency of the government's interest, Place
argued that only a special law enforcement need, such as officer
safety would constitute a sufficient government interest.6 1 The Court
disagreed,6 2 ruling that the appropriate focus was not on the nature
of the interest, but on the interest's relative importance.6 3 The Court
concluded that the government's interest in the control of illicit
drugs was sufficiently important to meet this requirement.64
Addressing the nature of the intrusion imposed, Place argued
58. By adopting this rule, the Court implicitly rejected the approach taken in United
States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (relevant inquiry is whether police conduct
was reasonable given all the circumstances).
59. Both concurrences criticized the Court for addressing the issue. The concurring
opinions argued that because the Court found that the ninety minute detainment was not
within the scope of a Terry stop, it had no occasion to decide whether Terry stops were applicable to seizures of luggage. 103 S. Ct. at 2646 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result), 103 S.
Ct. at 2651 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2642.
61. Id. This position was taken by Justice Stewart in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 707-708 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (government must demonstrate important purpose beyond normal goals of criminal investigation or extraordinary obstacle to such
investigation).
62. The Court argued that prior cases do not support the Place reasoning. In support of
this contention, the Court cited Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (government interest supporting initial seizure was effective crime prevention and detention), Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981) (Court held three government interests relevant: preventing flight
of defendant if incriminating evidence found, officer safety, and orderly completion of search).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2643. The Court noted that the relative effectiveness of the particular
technique employed should be considered in determining the importance of the police interest.
The Court found the technique effective in airport drug stops.
64. Id. at 2642. The Court cited United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (public has compelling interest in detecting those who traffic in
deadly drugs).

that Terry was inapplicable because seizures of property, unlike
seizures of persons, do not differ in degree. In the property context,
there are no substantially less intrusive seizures, for once a person is
dispossessed, the intrusion is complete and absolute. 65 The Court rejected this argument maintaining that seizures of personal property
could vary greatly in both nature and duration.6 6
After deciding that Terry was generally applicable to seizures
of property, the Court examined the particular actions of the agents
to determine whether they were sufficiently innocuous to trigger the
lower standard. The Court deemed it necessary first to address the
propriety of the dog sniff test, reasoning that if the test was a search
that required probable cause,6 7 the propriety of the agent's conduct
was irrelevant.6 8 The Court acknowledged that Place had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage.6 9 The Court also
observed, however, that a sniff test was far less intrusive than a
traditional search. Unlike the latter, a sniff test required neither the
opening of luggage nor the exposure of non-contraband items.7 0 The
Court concluded that these features of the technique were unique
71
and held that the test did not constitute a search.
The Court next turned to the question of whether the ninety
minute delay was within the scope of a Terry stop. The Court rejected the government's assertion that seizures of objects are generally less intrusive than seizures of persons.7 2 The Court noted that a
seizure of luggage might force the traveler to choose either to remain
with his bags and interupt his itinerary or to leave and be deprived
of possession. The Court concluded that "when the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody . . . the limitations applicable to
investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible
scope of an investigatory detention of the person's luggage on less
65.

103 S. Ct. at 2643. This position is supported in Comment, supra note 47, at 643-

46.
66. The Court contrasted seizure of luggage from an air traveler with a temporary
detention of mail voluntarily deposited into the mail system by way of example.
67. The majority of lower courts which have passed on the question have held that the
sniff test was not a search. However, authority exists to the contrary. Compare United States
v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) with United
States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).
68. Both concurrences contend that it was unnecessary for the Court to decide this
issue, in view of the Court's finding that the ninety minute detention of the bags exceeded a
permissible Terry stop. 103 S. Ct. 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result), 103 S. Ct. at
2653 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in the judgment).
69. 103 S.Ct. at 2644. The Court cited United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1967).
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
71. Id. at 2644-55.
72. This position was taken in the following cases: United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71
(1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Klein,
626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981) (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).

than probable cause."73 The Court declined to establish a maximum
time period for all investigative detentions but reasoned that it had
never approved the detention of a person for ninety minutes and,
therefore, the detainment of Place's luggage for this period was
unlawful.74
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion,
concurring in the result only.75 Brennan characterized the majority's
holding as a "radical departure from settled fourth amendment principles

. . .

which significantly dilute[d] the fourth amendment's pro-

tections against government interference with personal property." 7
Brennan argued that the balancing test employed by the Court was
unsupported by the Terry line of77cases, because such cases addressed
only the detainment of persons.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment of the Court.7 8 Blackmun was receptive
to the theory of applying Terry to the property context, but believed
the Court was in error in addressing the issue under the facts of the
case.79

Place expands the Terry exception. Police may now seize property, as well as persons, upon reasonable suspicion. The Court has
tempered this expansion by equating the two infringements. Since
the detention of luggage is no more intrusive than the detention of
persons, the Court has allowed police to take advantage of a valuable
law enforcement tool, while not infringing further upon the fourth
amendment rights of individuals.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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